. The advanced capitalisms, by contrast, are often depicted as examples of state failure, in terms of irresponsible financial policies and weak regulatory authority alongside some examples of market failure led by a few bad banking apples (cf. Canuto, Leipziger and Pinto, 2012; IMF, 2010a; World Bank, 2012) . The study of Mexico and Turkey in this juncture has been somewhat overlooked -and even more so in comparative terms -since the crisis did not originate in these countries, due to the popularity of the core BRICS cases among commentators, and because of Mexico and Turkey's seemingly rapid pace of economic recovery. Yet these two societies are OECD members that uniquely border two of the world's most powerful political and economic regions, the US and EU. Both countries, moreover, experienced the first and last of the major neoliberal financial crises For our purposes, the comparative cases of Mexico and Turkey help to demonstrate the ways in which crisis-driven neoliberal strategies of accumulation have been implemented and reinvented according to each society's domestic political economy and its integration into the financial world market (cf. Muñoz Martinez, 2008; Marois, 2011) . Both countries share histories of structural adjustment policies and export-led development strategies that swept globally since the 1980s. Yet as in most cases of neoliberal transformation their institutional landscapes and class structure characteristics continue to maintain specificities (cf. Albo, 2005; Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 2010) . Our study fills a gap in the developmental and international political economy literature in three ways. First, state intervention during the 2008-9 crisis through stimulus packages, expansion of credit and access to liquidity towards national companies was premised on the idea that national capital was more loyal to the economy, resulting into more employment and economic growth (Andersen, 2009 ). This assumption ignores that domestic capitalist might have as much interest as foreign capitalists to move their money away from their home economy as seen in the case of Mexico and Turkey. Thus, this type of state intervention might end up strengthening existing domestic structures of power instead of improving the living conditions of the population in general. Second, our examination of the Mexican and Turkish cases seeks to locate the agents within the capitalist class and the state in both countries in order to understand the concrete social forces that influence economic policymaking. This is central to the questioning of the domestic structures of power in its articulation with unequal global economic and political structures in order to propose alternative policies to neoliberalism. Third, most institutional comparative studies tend to overemphasise domestic specificity at the expense of simultaneously constituted and modified universalising capitalist structures missing the opportunity to contribute to how national differences constitute a universal if malleable global neoliberalism (e. g., MartinezDiaz, 2009; Öniş and Burak Güven, 2011) As our point of departure we examine Mexico and Turkey's official responses to the 2008-09 global financial crisis in their borders. In unique ways, the simultaneous interests of corporations and banks relative to the national fixing of capital and their mobility in the form of global investment heavily influenced each state authority's policy responses to the crisis. The interests of the poor, workers, and peasantry, by contrast, found little traction.
Rather than pitching this as either evidence of persistent national differentiation or some Keynesian state resurgence, we argue from a historical materialist geographical framework that the responses of capital and state authorities in Mexico and Turkey actively constitute and reconstitute the global parameters of market regulatory design and neoliberal class rule through each state's distinct domestic policy formation and crisis management processes.
The comparison analytically and concretely deepens the notion of variegated capitalism, and in doing so enables a critically informed and evidence-based approach to alternative development policy formation (cf. Peck and Theodore, 2007) .
A HISTORICAL MATERIALIST ALTERNATIVE: FRAMING CAPITAL FIXITY AND MOBILITY IN CRISIS
Geographical political economy asks how social relations are territorially grounded and how space shapes and is simultaneously shaped by economic and political power and social struggle (cf. Swyingedouw 2000) . Capital mobility and fixity are two internally dimensions of the same spatial processes of capital accumulation. This is shaped by the interaction of contentious social forces, which for our purposes involves class structures, capital, and state authorities. In this formulation, it is important to recall that from a historical materialist perspective, capital is an exploitative and unequal social relation that exists between capital and labour, is historically specific, and is the way in which value is preserved and multiplied through the appropriation of surplus labour (Marx, 1978, p. 40) . Moreover, as capital does not move in the form of production money is necessary for the repositioning of productive processes. The credit system in general and fictitious capital in particular are historically specific ways owners of money can move money across borders and into different sectors of the economy in search of valorisation. Today private fictitious capital claims take the form of shares, bonds, credits, and financial derivatives based on expected future surplus labour, future tax revenues and value flows that do not yet exist and dispossession strategies that have not yet been implemented (Harvey, 1999, pp. 265-67) .
These flows of capital, money, and credit -and their underlying class relationsconstitute the world market as we know it today. So while for Marx the mobility of capital is inherently global (1973, 408) -so too does money capital involve momentary fixity in order to appropriate and use labour power and nature to produce value and extract profit (Harvey, 2001, p. 312 ). This territorialised reproduction of capitalist social relations is structured by competitive imperatives to accumulate money capital, reproducing the tensions between capital mobility and fixity (Henwood, 1998, p. 231 ). Once value is produced, it can circulate and come to rest in another spatial fix. In the processes of competition, capital mobility and fixity are not detached from their contexts and from social agency. Rather, competitive processes are shaped by class (inter-and intra-) struggle. From a historical materialist approach, social class is not just the division of society according to one's income or market power but rather an understanding of how social relationships of production place historical beings into situations of antagonism: capitalists control the appropriation of surplus that workers produce with their labour power, which workers must sell in order to survive (Foster, 1990, 80-1). This relationship between classes and capital fixity and mobility takes place under financialisation. Money, credit, and fictitious capital claims have grown quantitatively more significant in accumulation and qualitatively more powerful in how everyone's lives are articulated within global capitalism (cf. Glyn, 2006; Lapavitsas, 2009) . The rise of financial imperatives has nonetheless caused differences within the capitalist class and capital mobility and fixity to become blurry. For instance, the securitisation of real estate and production can create fictitious capital out of fixed investment (Fox Gotham, 2009, pp. 355-71) . Landed interests and real estate developers need to link their activities to financial assets for expansion (Harvey, 2010, 50) . Global production firms that trade in stock exchanges and deal with financial derivatives need to fix their investments in low cost locations to produce profits. This interpretation offers an understanding of the ways in which the processes of fixity and mobility are internalised within capitalist firms. This provides an alternative understanding of capitalists, which are often analysed in terms of foreign vs. domestic capitalists and/or financial versus industrial fractions of capital, where the former seems more internationally financially oriented and the latter appears to be loyal to the national economy (Harvey, 1999, p. 316) .
Social classes are also connected to and shape the institutionalised political and economic practices of the state (Poulantzas, 1974, p. 25; cf. Jessop, 2010) . The results of social struggles can be conceived of as institutionalisations of power relations, which of course extend beyond class to institutionalised gendered, racialised, and imperial and colonial power relations. The state is central to both the reproduction of the relationship between capital fixity and mobility as well as to the mediation of underlying social and class conflict (Brenner and Elden, 2009, pp. 359, 364, 367) . The state is imbricated in processes of capital fixity and mobility as capital takes the form of the relocation of production and investment via money across state borders and its re-territorialisation in specific political jurisdictions (Bryan, 2001, pp. 64-5) . The way tensions between the fixity and mobility of capital are politically mediated and resolved (however fleeting) by state authorities depends on the historical specificity of the domestically situated class and power struggles (Poulantzas, 1974, p. 73 Mexico and Turkey were tightly linked to capital fixity. Consequently state authorities aimed to protect domestic markets, their core source of profit realization, with restrictions on imported goods and foreign-direct and portfolio investment in both cases. At the same time, these domestic corporations were linked to international capital mobility through their active involvement in nascent domestic bank-based financial groups and associated links to international bank syndicates largely in the US and Europe (White, 1992, p. 59; Gültekin-Karakaş, 2008) . Still, the mobility of these groups' financial assets was constrained by domestic capital controls deemed necessary for national developmental processes (Solís, 1997, p. 19; Aydın, 2005, p. 35) . The profits of financial groups remained closely tied to the fixity of their capital within Mexico and Turkey in the form of government protection, subsidies, domestic investment, and market expansion. Another way in which the process of capital mobility manifested itself in the ISI period, particular to the Mexican economy, was through export processing zones where foreign companies, mostly American, received the benefits of tax exemptions and used cheap labour to assemble manufactured products to be re-exported to the US. In both cases the very emergence of large domestic capital groups in these two national contexts was premised on supportive state policies that produced and reproduced exploitative productive, political, and social relations that disproportionately benefited domestic capital groups even as organised labour made some relative distributional gains (Marois, 2012, p. 68 ).
The 1979-82 US Volcker shock amidst mounting third world indebtedness led to the 1980s debt crisis that in turn triggered a phase of volatile and violent neoliberal transformations in peripheral capitalisms. Beginning in the 1980s both the Mexican and Turkish governments imposed increases in taxes and in the prices of public services on peasants, workers, and middle classes in order to help pay for foreign and public debts while making cuts to social programs and food subsidies (Correa, 2006, pp. 166-7; Yalman, 2002) . These two OECD members (Turkey 1960 , Mexico 1994 (Garrido, 2005, p. 100; Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, 2000, p. 487). Neoliberal transformation also entailed processes of capital centralisation and concentration among the large capital groups as these companies extended ownership and control over larger portions of their economies. Centralisation entailed these ever-larger groups tying together different stages of production and distribution by absorbing smaller firms and by diversifying assets to include everything from telecommunications, media broadcasting, construction, manufacturing, resource extraction, to of course banking and finance (Cokgezen, 2000) . In both cases, albeit unevenly and amidst contestation, neoliberal state authorities supported and facilitated centralisation and concentration through policies that enabled everything from M&A barriers, to access to foreign capital, to requirements, yet the costs of such re-regulation were compensated by profitability returns nearly double that possible in the advanced capitalisms' banking sectors (OECD 2010). The foreign banks in Mexico, in particular, have internalised profitability strategies that involve skimming off the best domestic clients, shying away from risky infrastructure and productive loans, and dealing in lucrative Mexican state debt certificates (Avalos and Trillo, 2006, p. 9; Guill n omo, 2005, p. 248; Stallings, 2006, p. 197 ). Turkey's large domestic banks have followed suit as have the restructured state banks, but to a lesser extent. In both cases an increasing chunk of all banks' returns comes from charging higher fixed fees and commissions alongside dealing in high interest rate consumer credit (Acosta Córdova, 2013; Bakir and Öniş, 2010) .
The economic opening of the 1980s and 1990s also put export processing zones (EPZs) at the centre of economic policy (Middlebrook and Zepeda, 2003, p. 538 ).
However, according to the ILO, while Mexico had 107 EPZs by 1997 Turkey had 11 (ILO 1998). While growing in significance in Turkey today, the Mexican case is more pronounced. In Mexico and Turkey (to a lesser magnitude) these zones rely on the investment of large global corporations, particularly from the United States and Europe.
The assembly plants are connected to capital mobility through global production networks but also connected to capital fixity through their reliance on the closeness to American and European markets, production infrastructure, and most importantly to the legal and economic conditions provided by state authorities to access cheap labour. In Turkey, moreover, the 'gap' for cheap labour and export processing capacity has been filled in part by the so-called SMEs (small and medium sized enterprises). In Turkey, SMEs are often associated with eastern or 'Anatolian' capital (as opposed to the large capital groups known as 'Istanbul' capital). These small firms are very significant economically and politically and often linked to larger, export oriented conglomerates (Sarıaslan, 2004, p. 9 ). The SMEs internalise fixity and mobility in complex ways specific to Turkey but not unlike Mexico's EPZs, insofar as their production is often tied to exports, if indirectly, but they are highly dependent on cheap and flexible labour in Turkey.
Locating Social Forces
Neoliberal transformations from the 1980s onwards distinctively strengthened particular economic actors in Mexico and Turkey. In Mexico, large Mexican companies, largely foreign-owned banks, firms in export processing zones, and investors in financial assets of large Mexican firms and public debt turned into influential forces within the capitalist class in Mexico. In Turkey, large Turkish companies and investors in firms and domestic debt became important influences within the capitalist class. However, the banks remain predominantly domestically-owned and tied to the large holding companies alongside three large state-owned banks and an only recently growing foreign bank presence. Additionally, SMEs and Anatolian-based capital have taken a place of almost parallel importance to the large Istanbul capital groups.
These economic transformations did not occur in a political vacuum. A striking feature of the neoliberal era is that it has remained in place, however modified, despite (Martin. 2011, pp.592-3) . The financial crisis spread over global credit markets as returns on risk increased rapidly and liquidity diminished (Eichengreen et al., 2012 (Eichengreen et al., , p. 1301 . The initial impact of the crisis on Europe and the US had serious consequences on Mexico and Turkey, as these countries rely economically for export markets and incoming investments. This will be analysed in the following section through the lens of capital mobility and fixity. The crisis revealed capitalists' distinct ties to capital fixity and mobility in the context of financialisation. Their distinct linkages to international finance and fixed processes of national production, circulation, and realisation shaped their responses to the crisis and created new sources of frictions among large firms, both national and foreign.
Large Mexican firms, including domestic and foreign banks, had more vested interests in capital fixity in Mexico than financial investors. The former relied more on their Mexican operations, domestic markets, and peso assets to realise an important share of their profits even though international capital mobility offered them the possibility to escape capital devaluation and find cheaper production sites outside of Mexico. Large Mexican firms also required a strong peso to reduce exchange rate risk in their foreign direct investment and financial operations in international financial markets. By contrast, exporting firms' main interests were not only tax exemptions but also a relatively low exchange rate. A strong peso threatened the competitiveness of their exports and diminished their gains from using cheap Mexican labour despite the gains appreciation gave exporters when purchasing inputs from abroad. As such, the interests of the export sector on peso devaluation diverged from financial investors, banks, and Mexican oligopolies requirements of a strong peso. Businessmen's Association), strongly resisted an IMF deal since it came with tax reform requirements that would impact them most directly (that is, by increasing tax enforcement thus threatening their implicit, if illicit, 'tax-breaks').
In different ways, capitalists in Mexico and Turkey were financially-oriented but territorially attached in different ways to their domestic economies in the form of production, dispossession, and credit. This suggests that the national or international legal origin of firms did not determine a particular commitment to the national fixity or global mobility of capital. In fact, the capitalist classes had different intra-class stakes in the global mobility and national fixity of capital, which varied by society and its productive and billion dollars (Banxico, 2009a, pp. 69-72) . To defend the Mexican peso, Banxico also remunerated US dollar deposits kept in the central bank (Cuadra et al., 2010, p. 288 Third, the PAN and AKP offered different types of loan guarantees and access to liquidity to the private sector. In Mexico, Banxico lent US dollars to commercial and development banks, drawing on a foreign currency swap line with the US Federal Reserve, totalling 3.22 billion dollars in the form of loans to private firms via commercial and development banks (Banxico, 2010, pp. 69-72) . In 2009, the central bank also auctioned interest rate swaps for up to 50 million US dollars to enable credit institutions to exchange their exposure to financial assets with fixed rates and long term maturities for short-term instruments with variable rates, reducing their risk structure and the duration of the credit institutions' assets (Cuadra et al. 2010, pp. 292-3) . Change in regulations allowed commercial banks to use new eligible assets as collateral to access liquidity from Banxico at lower rates. Development banks such as NAFINSA and Bancomext provided short-term financing in the form of guarantees on securities issued by firms, insuring up to 50 per cent of the securities issued (Cuadra et al. 2010, pp. 291-2) . In contrast to the PAN, the AKP directed loan guarantees and supports towards productive sectors like agriculture, SMEs, instruments in pesos for long-term government debt (Secretaria de Hacienda, 2011, pp. 21, 68) . As a result, public sector debt increased (Table 1) . While the Turkish Treasury entered into the crisis period in a relatively favourable position of having a 1.8 per cent budget surplus, it nonetheless had to contend with shortening debt maturities by the end of 2008, which fell from 34 to 32 months due to global instabilities and capital flight (PDMR, 2009, pp. 15, 18) . Authorities maintained Turkey's preceding trend of internalizing public debt (Table 1) .
Sixth, both countries unrolled rather limited, albeit distinct, stimulus packages. The Mexican government's stimulus packages launched in 2008 mostly promoted investment in infrastructure and expanded access to credit for the construction sector as well as private and public mortgage institutions (Secretaria de Hacienda, 2011; FMI, 2011, p. 40) .
Subsidies for exporting companies producing vehicles, auto parts, electronics and machinery were also part of the stimulus package. The Ministry of the Economy allowed companies to have production stoppages while absorbing some of the labour costs. In exchange, planned job cuts had to be limited to a third of the decline of sales (Galhardi, 2010, pp. 1-2) Resources were channelled to an expansion of social security coverage to workers forced into early retirement, workers' training and scrapping schemes and government, private sector (ILO, 2010.) Also, the budget for the poverty alleviation program Oportunidades increased 60 per cent (Feliz Herrera, 2011) .However, the importance of programs related to workers and anti-poverty projects in the stimulus package was not as significant as infrastructure spending and production subsidies. This stimulus package represented 1.6 per cent of Mexico's 2009 GDP.
Turkey's stimulus package, unlike in Mexico, was not unveiled until just ahead of local elections in March 2009 (OECD, 2012, p. 14) . It also focused primarily on raising domestic consumption through VAT to help capital reduce domestic capitals' overproduction stocks (Öniş and Güven, 2011, p. 5) . Some infrastructure expenditures were increased for the Southeastern Anatolia Project and corporate tax breaks provided to help relocate production to the East especially (PDMR, 2009, p. 13 ). This complimented the AKP regional strategy of locating labour intensive but globally competitive production to the east of Turkey where the Kurdish population seemingly offers a cheaper source of labour (Öztürk, 2012, p. 72) . By contrast, the AKP extendied unemployment benefits, Authorities' policies initially reflected the needs of large corporations to shed existing stocks, especially in consumer durables and autos, and to increase domestic liquidity for smaller firms. In response the Central Bank systematically reduced its policy rate and eased domestic liquidity requirements while the government, much later, provided VAT cuts for these goods as part of it delayed stimulus. As inflation continued to fall so too could the Central Bank's policy rate continue its decline. This led to a falling lira, which was thought to be nonetheless overvalued by as much as 25 to 60 per cent to the US dollar pre-crisis (Uygur, 2010, p. 56 (Table 1) .
Still, the way financialisation and neoliberalism worsen social inequality does not takes place is automatic and homogeneous ways but are rather shaped by the internal class structures and the political conditions of a country. In Mexico, targeting wages temporarily solved the global exporting firms' concerns over export competitiveness and left the strong peso policy intact. Thus the interests the exporting industries connected to global production companies through low wages became compatible with the interests of large
Mexican companies' goal of low production costs in their Mexican operations in order to increase the margins between profits and direct investment, and therefore the value of their stocks and bonds. Profitable yields in public debt, which sustained reserve accumulation and a strong peso, required debt repayment, and, therefore, an increase in non-oil revenues.
In Mexico, this was accompanied by regressive taxation, which allowed the accumulation of new resources to sustain debt management and reserve accumulation strategies. This 
